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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GENE GRAY, an individual, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
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DAVID FOSTER, an individual, 
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Case No. 20046 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for breach of contract and fraud 
brought by Plaintiff/Respondent Gene Gray against. Defendant David 
Foster and Defendant/Appellant Adrian Garritsen. Both Defendants 
Counterclaimed against Plaintiff. Since no appeal was brought by 
Defendant Foster, or by the Plaintiff against Foster; the 
judgment in favor of Foster and against Plaintiff is 
unchallenged. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Upon hearing the evidence and accepting the exhibits 
herein, the Honorable Philip Fishier, entered the following 
findings: 
1. That Plaintiff was liable for fraud upon Defendant 
Foster, the latter to have Judgment over and against Plaintiff 
for $5,000 on Defendant Foster's Counterclaim. 
2. No cause of action on the Plaintiff's Complaint 
against the Defendant Foster. 
3. That Plaintiff was given Judgment against Defendant 
Garritsen for $20,000 on his Complaint. This was later amended 
by Minute Entry to $25,000 dated April 13, 1984 and included in 
the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R=Record) 
(see R-123). 
4. Defendant Garritsen was awarded the Gold Ridge 
Claims 1 through 10, located in Section 14; Township 2 North; 
Range 1 East, in Davis County. 
5. No cause of action on Defendant Garritsen's 
Counterclaim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
1. Respondents requests that the judgment of the trial 
Court against Appellant be affirmed. 
2. That damages for delay under Rule 73(1) Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure be assessed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent accepts Appellants1 Statement of Facts 
except as to those facts which have been omitted and those which 
are controverted as enumerated below. Respondent believes that 
the facts below more completely conform to the transcript of the 
record. It should be noted that there is no matter on appeal 
between Respondent and Defendant F* ter; therefor their factual 
relationship is only included where relevant to the Appellant and 
Respondent herein. 
In 1980, the Plaintiff Gene Gray (Gray) met the 
Defendant David Foster (Foster) and loaned him $10,000 to start a 
Utah Corporation called Traders Exchange (Transcript~?r) (Tr 
140). In exchange for the loan, Gray was to obtain one-half of 
the stock to be owned by Foster in the future company plus his 
$10,000 back. (Tr 141; 193;194) The stock was lat* * defined to 
be 400,000 shares of stock (Tr 142) Nothing in writing was made 
of this Agreement (Tr 172). 
After the passage of some time, the Corporation was 
formed and Gray made demand for his stock and money but received 
nothing (Tr 142). 
The Defendant Adrian Garritsen (Garritsen) who was 
officing with Gray (Tr 144) then told Gray not to be involved 
with Foster but to deal through him. He would be the middleman 
and work it out (Tr 143). Gray & Foster entered into a limited 
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agency agreement (Exhibit 2-D) (Tr 212) whereby Garritsen was to 
obtain a Duplex from Foster for Gray. Garritsen then believed he 
could take funds from the Duplex transaction to obtain mining 
property in Bountiful, Utah for Gray (Tr 214). Garritsen 
promised an old Granddaddy claim owned by one Bulkley that had 
been in operation since 1958 (Tr 144). He also gave an ore 
sample to Gray (Tr 145; Exhibit P-1); Gray received Assay Reports 
on the ore made in 1978 (Tr 151 & 154; Exhibit P-ll). Garritsen 
said the mine was valuable and that there was a buyer for it who 
would put a $10,000 down payment on it (Tr 145; 158 Exhibit P-9) 
and that there was ore being shipped from the mine (Tr 158). 
Garritsen claims this was not the only mine he knew of (Tr 
224). But Gray claims this was the only mine he would accept, 
and the only one he knew of (TR 146). 
Based upon this relationship with Garritsen, Gray 
signed exhibits 2-D; 3-D; 4-D; & 5-D (TR 144) drawn-up by 
Garritsen (Tr 194), which purport to be settlement and release 
documents; but Gray never got anything of value directly from 
either Foster or Garritsen (Tr 195). 
However, in February 1982, Garritsen had Foster 
transfer his duplex in Santaquin to Wall Investment (Tr 204) 
through a friend of his whom he had known for 10 years by the 
name of Goodsil (Tr 205). From this transaction Garritsen 
personally received $5,500 in cash and the forgiveness of 
principal and interest on notes in an amount of $16,000 
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(Tr 206). The total sales price on the Duplex was $49,378.83. 
Owing on the Duplex was approximately $24,000.00; therefore, the 
equity in the Duplex was approximately $25,000.00 (Tr 206-207; 
Exhibit 19-D). All of the proceeds from this transaction went to 
Garritsen (Tr 215), and Garritsen did not tell Gray about this 
(Tr 228). According to the Agency Agreement (Exhibit 2-D) this 
$25,000.00 should have gone to Gray. Instead, Garritsen tried to 
find mining claims for Gray. 
Gray became suspicious about the mine transaction when 
he went to see Bulkley, the supposed owner, with the 10 Gold 
Ridge nining claims that Garritsen had tendered to him in 
November of 1982 (Tr 159; 163; Exhibit 14-P) and Bulkley 
disclaimed any knowledge of the sale (Tr 161; Exhibit 8-P). Gray 
then went to the Recorder's office in Farmington and obtained the 
information on exhibit 17-P (Tr 167) and then to \he Bureau of 
Land Management (Tr 165) and obtained the information on exhibit 
16-P; and then to the State office to obtain the information on 
Exhibit 15-P (Tr 164-165). The actual exhibits were obtained at a 
later date (TR 164-167). All of these exhibits indicate no 
property by the name of Gold Ridge, existed prior to September of 
1982 (Tr 166). At the time that Garritsen had tendered the 10 
Gold Ridge mining claims in November of 1982, Gray had believed 
them to be the same claims that he had discussed earlier (Tr 195) 
with the existing mine in operation, shipping ore, upon which he 
had the Assay report and which had a potential buyer; otherwise 
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he would not have signed exhibit 3-D, the release (Tr 195). Gray 
concluded that on or about November 26, 1982, the Gold Ridge 
claims tendered to him by Garritsen were not the claims they had 
been discussing (Tr 284 & 292). (Under questioning from the 
Court, Garritsen admitted that "it was a brand new claim 
location". (Tr 142-143)) Therefore, Gray rejected the tender of 
the 10 Gold Ridge claims (Tr 122). The evidence shows that 
according to Garritsen there were in fact 2 mining claims in Ward 
Canyon, above Bountiful (Tr 224, 226-227), and that Garritsen had 
authority to sell the claim owned by Bulkley (Tr 225) and 
supplied Gray with pertinent data on that claim (Tr 226). Also, 
that Bulkley was doing business as Prospect Mines; but exhibit 
15-9 by the Secretary of State indicates to the contrary (Tr 228-
229). In addition, Gray discovered that there had been no 
assessment work done on the Gold Ridge Claims and no prior claims 
appeared on the records of the BLM (Tr 230). 
With respect to Garritsen's Counterclaim, he claims to 
have sold $25,000 of product to Bare Body Products (Tr 248) and 
helped collect $9#50G on an account in Puerto Rico and one in 
Portland, Oregon and estimates that the total collections 
effected by him total $50,000 (Tr 250-251). All of the foregoing 
is based upon a verbal agreement that he was to get 10 percent of 
the amounts he collected (Tr 241) and 50 percent, after expenses, 
of amounts of products that he sold (Tr 241). But he had no 
documentary proof of any of these claims and was just assuming 
that he had money coming (Tr 258). He did not see the check for 
the Bare Body account (Tr 256) and can't remember the amounts of 
the accounts collected (Tr 257). Gray testified that there was 
never an employment agreement with Garritsen (Tr 285). Just 
"...ten percent of anything he could collect or 25 percent of 
anything he could sell". (Tr 285) There was only less than 
$1,000 collected and never in ex^ ss of $100.00 sold (Tr 285). 
Bare Body never paid (Tr 285) and Garritsen was paid $250.00 for 
his services (Tr 285) and Garritsen admits this (Tr 248). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO 
FIND AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION, OR 
RELEASE BETWEEN RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT 
OR A WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL 
A careful review of the record reveals that Garritsen 
in his answer, (R 12-16* .;er complied with Rule 8(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procecure, in that he never pleaded as an 
affirmative defense, neither Accord and Satisfaction nor 
estoppel, nor payment, nor release, nor any other matter. Rule 8 
(c) states in its pertinent parts as follows: 
(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a 
preceding pleading, a party shall set forth 
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration 
and award, assumption of risk, contributory 
negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, 
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, 
license, payment, release, res judicata, statute 
of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any 
other matter constituting an avoidable or 
affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly 
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designated a defense as a counterclaim or a 
counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if 
justice so requires, shall treat the pleadings as 
if there had been a proper designation. (Emphasis 
Added) 
These issues were raised for the first time in 
Garritsen's Brief. This Court has held that these kinds of 
Affirmative Defenses are required to be included in the Answer. 
Accord and satisfaction is an affirmative 
defense which ordinarily must be pleaded in the 
answer in order to be raised. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 8(c). Hintze v. Seaich, 437 P.2d 
202, 20 Utah 2d 275, 275 (1968) 
Defenses of accord and satisfaction, account 
stated, and laches are affirmative defenses which 
are required to be stated in answer. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 8(c)." F.M.A. Financial 
Corp. v. Build, Inc. , 404 P.2d 670, 17 Utah 2d 80 
(1965) 
By not raising them in his Answer in a timely manner as 
required by Rule 8(c), and pursuant to the language of this Court 
in the above cited cases, Garritsen has waived his right to now 
raise these Affirmative Defenses and they should be stricken from 
In addition to the foregoing and should the Court 
desire further argument, there was ample testimony to the effect 
that the so called "Release" document (Exhibit 3-D) was signed 
based upon the belief by Gray, that he had received the 10 mining 
claims that he had discussed in February with Garritsen and upon 
which he had obtained the ore (Exhibit 1-P); assay reports 
(exhibit 11-P); with a potential buyer (Exhibit 9-P); from which 
ore was being shipped (Tr 158). Gray stated (Tr 195) that the 
-8-
only reason that he signed Exhibit 3-D among other things was the 
belief that the ten mining claims offered to him by Garritsen on 
Exhibit P-14 were the same ten that he had discussed earlier. "I 
trusted Garritsen's word" (Tr 195) stated Gray; but Garritsen did 
not tell Gray about the money he had made from the sale of the 
Duplex (Tr 228), nor did he explain to Gray that there were in 
fact 2 mines in the same area. Gray stated he believed "There 
was only one mine on that section of ground" (Tr 146). Clearly 
what happened, was that Garritsen, since he had the receipts from 
the Duplex sale in his pocket, and since Bulkley refused to sell 
the mine that he had discussed with Gray, went out and staked 
some adjacent claims and tendered them to Gray, (Tr 279-280) 
without telling him. 
This writer has not been able to find any cases 
directly on point concerning releases, but will follow the 
admonition of this Court in Horgan, infra. 
a release is a type of contract and may gene y^ 
be enforced or rescinded on the same grounds as 
other contracts. Horgan v. Industrial Design, 
Corp., 657 P.2d 751 (1982) 
Obviously, there was a mistake made by Gray when he 
signed Exhibit 3-D since he signed it upon the belief that he was 
getting the "Granddaddy" claims (Tr 146). This Court has held 
that under such circumstances these agreements are not 
enforceable: 
Agreement obtained by misrepresentation, fraud, or 
mistake is generally voidable. Tanner v. District 
Judges of Third Judicial District Court In and For 
Salt Laic- County, 649 P.2d 5. (1982) 
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Transactions between persons occupying fiduciary 
and confidential relations with each otherf in 
which the stronger or supervisor party obtains an 
advantage over the other, cannot be upheld. 
Glover v. Glover, 242 P.2d 298, 121 Utah 362 
(1966) 
Accordingly, the so called release cannot be 
enforced. In addition, because Garritsen did not deliver the 
property that he had promised (Tr 144) there was a failure of 
consideration which the Court has ably defined as follows: 
There is distinction between 'lack of 
consideration' and 'failure of consideration1, 
where consideration is lacking, there can be no 
contract? where consideration fails, there was 
contract when agreement was made, but because of 
some supervening cause, promised performance 
fails. General Insurance Co. of America v. 
Carnicero Dynasty Corp. 545 P.2d 502 (1976) 
When this happens, the Court has held that that part or 
failure of performance prevents the use of Accord and 
Satisfaction as a defense. 
Part performance of an accord by the debtor, 
accompanied by unjustified failure to perform the 
remainder, is not operative as a satisfaction and 
does not bar an action in the original claim. 
Stratton v. West States Construction 440 P.2d 117, 
21 Utah 2d 60 (1968). "in action by homeowners 
against Corporation for alleged Breach of Contract 
and fraud in relation to remodeling work done on 
home, plead of Accord and Satisfaction did not 
constitute a defense to Corporation since the 
Corporation failed to complete its performance 
according to agreement of the parties, (ibid) 
The current case before the bar is akin to the same 
dilemma that the Plaintiff found herself in, in the Hatch case, 
infra, wherein the Defendant tried to unilaterally change the 
_i n _ 
performance. In that case, the Court had no problem in m^ ig 
short shrift of the Defendant's claim of Accord and Satisfaction. 
Where defendant, after paying for gilsonite ore 
based on deli ,*ry weights for a time, unilaterally 
began to deduct 15% from all payments thereafter 
made calculated on deliverv weights as claimed L/ 
plaintiff and plaintiff ace ^ted the checks as 
paid to him but there never was any agreement that 
he would be satisfied with such arrangement and 
he was constantly told by defendant's officials 
that they would pay him for all of the ore which 
he deliverd, there was not an account stated an 
there was no accord and satisfaction of the matter 
that would support interpreting contract as 
agreeing that claimed weight minus 15% was the 
correct tonnage. Hatch v. Zieglar Cheiu+cdl and 
Mineral Corporation, 506 P.2d 71, 29 Utah 2d 151 
(1973) 
In addition, the record is clear that Gray, once he 
found out about the changed claims, repudiated the offer by 
stating, "...I found out Friday that there was a switch. Monday, 
I went ...I called Garritsen, and I told him, 'I am not go^ng to 
accept something that I didn't buy." (Tr 161). Under these 
conditions the Court has held that this effectively negates the 
Accord. 
Where there is dispute about claim and o^ e party 
makes an offer of settlement which is ccepted and 
performed by other, that constitutes "accord &nd 
satisfaction" of claim but accord may be negated 
by any dispute by offeree of settlement. Ben lett 
v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 417 P.2d 761, 18 
Utah 2d 141 (1966) 
Perhaps Gray's reliance upon Garritsen was childlike, 
and in view of after events, ill advised but there is precident 
for it in the history of this Court as outlined in the following 
1962 case. 
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Ordinarily party has right to rely upon fact that 
formal document prepared by other will express 
their original and definite agreement, and he may 
expect and rely upon literal conformity if no 
notice to the contrary is given. Mawhinney v. 
Jensen, 232 P.2d 769, 120 Utah 142 (1962) 
And ultimately, in a most recent case the Court has 
explained why Garritsen's First claim for error must fail; since 
Gray's proceeding against Garritsen was based upon their original 
agreement that acting as Gray's agent, Garritsen would satisfy 
his claim against Foster. See Bradshaw v. Burningham, 671 P.2d 
196 (1983) 
"An executory accord, on the other hand, "is an 
agreement that an existing claim shall be 
discharged in the future by the rendition of a 
substituted performance." 6 Corbin Contracts 
§1269 at 75 (1962). The agreement does not 
discharge the existing claim; it is discharged by 
the substituted performance. If there is a 
failure to perform the executory accord, the 
creditor may elect to proceed either upon his 
original claim or the accord. L & A Drywall, Inc. 
v. Whitmore Construction Co., Utah, 608 P.2d 626, 
629 (1980) 
Based upon the evidence before the trial Court, there 
was no proper Affirmative Defense pleaded in Garritsen's 
Answer. There was no fulfillment of performance that would 
warrant the trial Court finding that there had been an Accord and 
Satisfaction; release or waiver and estoppel. Indeed, as this 
Court concluded in the Hintze case infra and as the trial Court 
concluded in the case at Bar, ..." there was no meeting of the 
minds..." (Tr 297), which is an absolute prerequisite to the 
formation of a contract. 
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"In suit by former employees of defendant to 
recover wages and commissions allegedly due them, 
burden was upon the former employees to prove by 
preponderance of evidence the amount to which 
they were entitled. Since voucher which was 
attached to check and which stated "This is the 
balance of your account in full" did not state 
that the check was to be returned if it was not so 
accepted, it was clear that there was no meeting 
of minds thai acceptance of the check by former 
salesman was to be in complete settlement of 
dispute with former employer as to commissions 
owed, and accordingly, former salesman's cashing 
of the check did not constitute an accord and 
satisfaction." Hintze v. Seaich, 437 P.2d 202, 20 
Utah 2d 275 (1968) (Emphasis Added). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT AWARD EXCESSIVE 
DAMAGES TO APPELLANT AND WAS CORRECT IN 
FINDING FOR RESPONDENT ON APPELLANT'S 
COUNTERCLAIM. 
On the question of damages this Court has laid down the 
ground rules in a 1968 case as follows: 
Desired objective in computing damages, is to 
evaluate any loss suffered by the most direr*-, 
practical and accurate method that can be 
employed. Even Odds, Inc. v. Nielson, 44b ..2d 
709, 22 Utah 2d 49 (1968) 
In the case at Bar, the evidence is clear that 
Garritsen, undertook to become Gray's agent and handle the 
transaction involving Foster (Tr 143; 195) and even drew all of 
the papers up. Therefore, the evidence on the sale of the Duplex 
is unequivical and clearly indicates that the equity in the same 
was at least $25,000.00 (Tr 207; Exhibit 19-D). This equity 
belonged to Gray and should have be made available to Gray in 
Februaiy of 1982, shortly after the closing. Therefore, the 
Courts' finding of a $25,000.00 judgment is based upon reason, 
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and the best available evidence before the Court. It is also the 
law of this State, as contained in the following cases: 
"Generally, damages awarded for personal property 
which is taken or destroyed are based on item's 
market value at time of taking or destruction." 
Winters v. Charles Anthony, Inc., 586 P.2d 453 
"Non breaching party should receive award which 
will put him in as good position as he would have 
been in had there been no breach of contract. 
Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Co., 455 P. 2d 197, 23 
Utah 2d. Also followed in Utah Farm Production 
Credit Association v. Cox 627 P.2d 62. 
General rule in contract law is that damages 
recoverable for breach are those which arise 
naturally from the breach and which reasonably may 
be supposed to have been within contemplation of 
parties or are reasonably foreseeable and they are 
essentially compensatory in nature." Robbins v. 
Finlay, 645 P.2d 623. 
In addition, should there be any question as to the 
correctness of the award, the trial Court has been granted some 
leeway by this Court in assessing damages as outlined in the two 
decisions that follow: 
"Minute findings by trial court are not required 
and it need not detail every item which goes into 
a finding of damages in breach of contract 
cases." Holman v. Sorensen, 556 P.2d 499. 
"Where there is evidence of fact of damage, 
defendant may not escape liability on ground that 
amount of damage cannot be proved with 
precision." Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, (1983) 
In accord is Cook Associates, Inc., v. Warnick, 
664 P.2d 1161 (1983); Turtle Management, Inc. v. 
Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P. 2d 667. 
Garritsen emphasizes his testimony that he spent 
$20,000.00 plus labor which he valued at $1,500.00 (Tr 239, 240) 
and that the Gold Ridge claims were made at Grayfs request (Tr 
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227). But under cross-examination, Garritsen admitted that Gray 
gave him no money to go out and get the Gold Ridge claims; and in 
factf the very name "Gold Ridge" was created by him and Bulkley 
(Tr 253). There was no documentary evidence as to the alleged 
$20,000.00 expenditure (Tr 255). Garritsen also claimed that he 
had no duty to do assessment work or perfect the claims (Tr 230); 
yet Gray had made it clear to him that he would not, and did not 
accept the substituted "Gold Ridge" mining claims, for the 
"Granddaddy" claims he had earlier bargained for (Tr 259, 260). 
Under the case law above cited, once Gray had refused the tender 
of the changed performance, there could be no settlement and the 
mining claims were Garritsen's responsibility. 
With respect to Garritsen1s counterclaim, the trial 
Court held that the evidence was evenly balanced and therefore, 
Garritsen failed to carry his burden of proof therein (R 122). 
In looking at the evidence one must keep in mind this Court's 
admonition that "Damages cannot be found from mere speculation 
and conjectured evidence/1 Bennell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597, 13 
Utah 2d 83 (1962). About the only point that there is harmony 
on, in the evidence, is the fact that there was an oral 
agreement, between Garritsen and Gray, whereby Garritsen would 
get 10 percent of any money he collected, and a percentage of any 
income from sales that he generated, less expenses (Tr 241; 
285). Gray claims that since the agreement, "And I don't think 
there was $1,000.00 collected, and there's never over a hundred 
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dollars sold" (Tr 285). Further, that the Bare Body account 
never paid, but from his suing them to recover money he paid 
Garritsen $250.00 (Tr 285). Therefore, even if we allow that 
there was $100.00 in sales, and $1,000.00 collected, and even if 
we view the agreement in the best light for Garritsen, he was not 
entitled to more than 10 percent of $1,000.00 plus 50 percent of 
$100.00, which totals $150.00. Both of them agree he was paid in 
excess of this amount (Tr 285; 248). Therefore, how has he been 
damaged? Garritsen claims he sold some of the products to Bare 
Body Products Company (Tr 247) and that they would expend 
$25,000.00 on Gray's products (Tr 248). He also claims to have 
helped to collected $50,000.00 in receivables (Tr 249); but 
Garritsen admitted that these figures and names were hazy in his 
memory because, "I don't have access to the records" (Tr 251). 
But he did in fact have access to the records. The complaint in 
this matter was filed on June 29, 1983 (R2), and served upon 
Garritsen on June 25, 1983 (R8). The cutoff date on discovery 
was not until November 15, 1983 (R43), therefore, had Garritsen 
been earnest in his counterclaim, he had a full five months in 
which to seek the records, through discovery. The record shows, 
he failed to do this. He cannot now be found to complain that he 
did not have the records to substantiate his claims. In fact, 
under cross examination, Garritsen could not remember any 
amounts, or any checks that Gray received as a result of his 
efforts (Tr 256) and he simply admitted, "I do not know" twice 
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(Tr 257) when questioned for more specifics. Further, he 
admitted that he was just making assumptions,and did not have any 
actual facts (Tr 258). 
Respondent claims that based upon the foregoing, the 
trial Court was generous to even hold that the evidence was even 
on Garritsen's Counterclaim; arid was fully justified in holding 
that Garritsen had failed to carry his burden oi proof on his 
counterclaim, therefor, no cause of action. 
III. THIS APPEAL WAS MADE SOLELY FOR DELAY: 
THEREFORE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO AN 
INCREASE IN HIS COSTS IN AN AMOUNT NOT TO 
EXCEED 25 PERCENT OF THE JUDGMENT 
APPEALED FROM. 
Rule 73(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads 
as follows: 
(1) Dismissal Of Appeal: Penalty For Delay. 
Failure of the appellant to take any of the 
further steps to secur the review of the case, 
except filing notice of appeal and depositing the 
fees therefor, shall not affect the validity of 
the appeal but is ground for such actions as the 
district court deems appropriate, which may 
include dismissal of the appeal. On the trial of 
the cause on appeal, if it appears to the court 
that the appeal was made solely for delay, it may 
add to the costs such damages as may be just, not 
exceeding twenty-five perc^ rit of the judgment-
appealed from. (Emphasis auded) 
From the history of this case, there are several 
incidents pertaining to the Defendant Garritsen which if taken 
singly, may not carry sufficient weight to allow this court to 
grant Gray delay damages under Rule 73(1); but if taken 
collectively and viewed as a whole indicate a lack of sincerety 
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and purpose in both his defense and counterclaims in the case at 
Bar. 
Firstly, Garritsen1s Answer has none of the Affirmative 
Defenses in it which are required under Rule 8(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Procedure (R 13-17 )• Surely, a serious defendant would 
have included these in his Answer, had he believed them available 
at the time. But these appear to be an afterthought on 
Garritsenfs part, after having lost in the trial Court, and 
groping for means to delay the imposition of the Court's 
ruling. In addition, the Answer and Counterclaim was filed late. 
Another indication of Garritsen1s apparent indolent approach to 
the case. 
Secondly, there was no timely discovery attempted by 
Garritsen on either his counterclaim or the complaint against him 
(See Record on Appeal). Yet at the time of trial, and in his 
brief, Garritsen indicates that he never had access to the 
records (Tr 256 - 258). Yet he never made any attempt to obtain 
them. The Record is void of any indication that Garritsen was 
serious about this case until he filed his appeal. Surely this 
is an indication that he is filing the appeal as an afterthought, 
or out of desparation, to cover his nonchalant approach up to the 
trial. Is this not a delaying tactic? 
Thirdly, less than one month before pre-trial, 
Garritsen changed attorney (R-42) and yet he still did not amend 
his pleadings to add the Affirmative Defenses or seek discovery 
on his counterclaim. Again, are these the actions of a person 
who is seriously intent on defending his case and proving his 
counterclaim? 
Fourthly, Garritsen has only filed a Cost Bond in this 
matter rather than a supersedeas Bond. Apparently, in an 
attempt to save the costs of the more inclusive supercedeas bond 
(R128). But is this the act of a serious Appellant, who is 
genuine in his Appeal? 
Respondent sub its that when the Court looks at all of 
these acts of the Defendant-Appellant Garritsen, taken in their 
entirety, that the Court has ample grounds to find that the 
Appeal was made solely for delay or, at least, that the appeal 
level is not the appropriate time to begin to fight the case 
seriously. Further, that if the Court so finds that $6,250.00 is 
a just amount to be awarded Gray for his damages in having to 
defend this Appeal. 
Respectfully submitted on this 15th day of October, 
1984. 
"•"^ -efaham Dodd * 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 521-3680 
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